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Abstract
In the management of spare parts for durables OEMs often face a sharp decline in
sales of spare parts when the warranty period of their products ends. One reason for
this effect is given by the high profitability of the after sales market which attracts
competitors. If the competitors’ main sourcing option consists of repairing used or
broken parts, an acquisition of those parts by the OEM might lower competition and
increase sales. The purpose of this paper is to provide a case-based framework to
offer insights on the opportunity of recovering parts. We consider a two-stage supply
chain, where independent repair shops are responsible for handling the repair process.
There are two options to meet spare parts demand: repair shops may replace the part
with a new one (ordered from the OEM) or they may use a part that they repaired
before. While repair shops achieve a larger profit by repairing parts, the OEM would
prefer the use of new parts. However, he has no control on demand which might be
obtained through buyback of broken parts. Furthermore, the OEM could recover these
parts on a higher level, thus reducing production/procurement of new parts. The
main contribution of this paper is to elaborate the important effects of recoverable
items acquisition on spare parts demand by using a simple deterministic framework
thus outlining the impact of different parameters on the profitability of spare parts
management.
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Recovery, Case Study
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1. Introduction
An efficient spare parts management is of strategic importance for Original Equip-
ment Manufacturers (OEM) producing durable goods. In fact, OEMs must assure the
availability of an after sales service enabling the replacement of broken parts during
the entire product life cycle (PLC) and also for a given period in the post PLC. By
regulation in many countries, the provision of spare parts must be guaranteed not only
during the warranty period, but also over the average usage period. The main features
of spare parts management and its implication on related inventories have been dis-
cussed in a recent literature review by Kennedy et al. (2002) and may be subsumed as
follows:
• Dynamic and uncertain demand. According to Hesselbach et al. (2002), the
time-variability of spare parts demand follows a different pattern along PLC and
along post PLC. As a complicating issue, information on reliability is usually
not available at the beginning of the PLC. Moreover, according to Kalchschmidt
et al. (2003), spare parts management is often organized in supply chains with
a various number of echelons including multi-modal operations where the highly
variable (and often lumpy) demand is lacking visibility over the whole distribution
channel.
• Multi item. Spare parts management has to support all the goods that a com-
pany sold in the past, as well as those it currently produces. Each generation has
different parts, so the service network often has to cope with 20 times the number
of SKUs that the manufacturing function deals with (Cohen et al., 2006). Sher-
brooke (1968) firstly proposed a system approach instead of an item approach for
simplifying the recoverable item control, and Thonemann et al. (2002) present
analytical models to easily approximate the improvements.
• Obsolescence. According to Hesselbach et al. (2002), the levels of spare part
inventory are determined by balancing the risk/cost of extended downtime of
a critical part, because of delay in obtaining a spare part, against the cost of
holding the inventory and the risk that the stored spare parts become obsolete
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before use. Obsolescence is a severe problem for those parts which are rarely
needed.
An additional complexity of the spare parts management activities originates from
the possibility of satisfying spare parts demands from different sources. These sources
may be grouped into two main sets:
• Production or procurement of new parts
• Recovery of returned parts, e.g. through repair or remanufacturing
In the case of part recovery, the flow of parts becomes complicated and additional
effects cannot be neglected, such as the presence of uncertainty in the recovery process
itself in terms of timing, quantity and quality (see, e.g., Inderfurth and Mukherjee,
2008). Moreover, enabling part recovery implies that recovery activities in principle
can be performed both by the manufacturer of the original parts (or by the supplier of
the OEM) but also by others.
According to Toffel (2003), different product recovery strategies may involve several
independent actors (Parts Manufacturer, OEM, Repair Center) that may cooperate or
compete each other, therefore involving a wide set of after sales service control alter-
natives. In some cases OEMs (e.g. Lexmark printer and toner cartridge manufacturer)
tried to prevent the possibility of local remanufacturing by independent third parties
by introducing legal restrictions or technology constraints (e.g. an encrypted chip in the
cartridge that can be reset only by the OEM). However, in many industries (of which
the automotive sector is the most significant) a parallel grey market already exists for
spare part supply. As underlined by Majumder and Groenevelt (2001), a key issue
in the competition is given by the capability of the procurement of recoverable used
parts. Moreover, the possibility of independent recovery made by smaller firms (i.e.
local remanufacturers or Repair Shops) may lead to recovery processes using different
systems and technologies, thus causing a spread recovery process in terms of quality
and reliability of spare parts.
This paper presents an analytical model which aims at capturing the main economic
trade-offs in spare parts management considering two main actors of the service supply
chain: an OEM of durable goods and a network of independent repair shops. Both
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actors are engaged in product recovery but only the repair shops have direct access
to broken parts. This supply chain structure differs from the existing literature and
allows us not only to focus on the competition between recovered and new parts in
the supply of spare parts but also to show that both actors could be better off when
cooperating. From this perspective our analysis contributes to a deeper understanding
of the inherent characteristics of spare parts management for durables and the effects of
part recovery along a closed-loop supply chain. The real-life application that motivates
this research is taken from the after sales service provided by an Italian manufacturer
of heaters and boilers.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the case study that inspired
the current work while Section 3 presents a focused literature review. Section 4 intro-
duces the model assumptions and the notation. Section 5 describes a basic two period
deterministic model, and Section 6 presents a numerical example to show the applica-
bility of the model. Section 7 outlines the main conclusions and managerial insights
that can be drawn from this research.
2. Case Study
The company that inspired the current study is located in Northern Italy and
manufactures gas heating systems and boilers. It has been active in the sector for
more than forty years, reaching a recognized reputation of specialization and reliability.
In 2005, the company reached a turnover of 200 Million Euro employing more than
700 people. The product range encompasses more than 60 boilers differing in the
heating purpose (hot water or combined hot water for the heating system and domestic
use), power capacity, and installation capabilities (outdoor or indoor). Products are
continuously under development implying that the average selling life of a product is
about 5 years.
On the average, a boiler life-time is about 10 years: during this period a number
of components might fail because of wearing out. The failure behavior of the product
is almost unpredictable due to usage (e.g. heating load) and environmental conditions
(e.g. water alkalinity). Gas heating boilers consist of about 15 different modules out of
three categories: non failing (e.g. casing), repairable, and non-repairable (e.g. burner).
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Figure 1: OEM and repair shops forward and reverse flows
Out of the repairable class, the most expensive (about 6 percent of product value) is
the gas valve. In several countries legal obligations require the OEM to provide spare
parts during the normal life span of their products (e.g. referring to the Italian case
study, 10 years for boilers). Thus, within this period, the OEM is obliged to satisfy
any customer demand with spare parts when product components fail.
After sales service is performed by a network of independent repair shops (about
500 all over Italy). All relevant forward and reverse flows between the different actors
are depicted in Figure 1. Repair shops are responsible for the installation of new boilers
and they also take care of the repairing process during the entire life cycle. For several
parts (e.g. gas valve), two alternatives to service exist: repair shops may replace the
component by a new one ordered from the OEM (replacement part) or, if a formerly
broken and restored part is available, they can use such a recovered component (repair
part). Both service options lead to an inflow of broken parts at the repair shop. All
broken parts can be repaired using so-called “repair kits”.
Currently, the OEM does not control the after sales service channel, thus repair
shops freely choose their sourcing option. In general, repair shops earn a larger profit
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by selling repaired parts rather than using new parts and customers usually prefer
(due to cheaper price) repaired parts to new ones. Thus, only when repaired parts
are out of stock, repair shops order parts at the OEM. Such a behavior yields sudden
and unexpected disruption of the demand streams the OEM faces. The present work
investigates the profitability of an acquisition of broken parts from the repair shop,
therewith trying to prevent uncontrolled repair, too. Furthermore, the results provide
insights on how buyback prices should be set under different conditions.
3. Literature Review
This paper focuses on the competition between different suppliers including at least
one supplier performing product recovery. A number of papers addresses related issues
by dealing with the primary product. Similarly to our model Majumder and Groenevelt
(2001) propose a two-period model to examine the effects of competition in remanu-
facturing. In the first period, only the OEM manufactures and sells new items. In the
second period, a fraction of these items are returned for remanufacturing. However,
the OEM does not get all returned items, as some are used up by the local remanu-
facturer. The model’s results show how the presence of competition causes the OEM
to manufacture less in the first period intending to increase the local remanufacturers
costs. In addition, a recent contribution by Ferguson and Toktay (2006) analyzes the
competition between new and remanufactured products a monopolistic manufacturer
sells with the objective of identifying conditions under which the firm would choose to
remanufacture its own products. Moreover, the potential profit loss due to external
remanufacturing competition is considered.
The durable goods literature is relevant because it allows to appreciate the effect
of endogenous competition determined by used items. Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006)
investigate market segmentation in situations where a manufacturer sells both original
and remanufactured goods. They study a company that makes new products in the first
period and uses returned cores to offer remanufactured products, along with new ones,
in several future periods. They consider a monopoly environment both in two-period
and multi-period scenarios to identify the thresholds in remanufacturing operations.
In addition, they focus on the duopoly environment where a third party may recover
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cores of products made by the OEM.
In Ray et al. (2005), the optimal pricing/trade-in rebate strategies for durable
remanufacturable products is analyzed to catch the main drivers that encourage cus-
tomers to give back products. In particular, the aim of the model is to determine
the optimal price for new customers and the optimal trade-in rebate for replacement
customers. Heese et al. (2005) propose a model to investigate profitability of the take-
back strategy adopted by an OEM that resells refurbished products. They show that a
refurbishing manufacturer not only increases its unit margin, but also its market share
to the detriment of a non-interfering competitor.
A case study related to the spare parts management for durable goods is discussed
in Deneijer and Flapper (2005). The authors analyze business drivers that push the
OEM to take back the parts resulting from repair activities. In particular, they identify
three main reasons:
• to accommodate users who ask the repair shop to dispose of broken parts,
• to avoid accidents due to inappropriate repair or overhaul of parts, and
• to collect data on the quality state of used parts so as to gain insight into the
time-phased failure behavior of these parts.
Beside this, they concentrate their analysis on organizational aspects concerned with
the logistic and planning activities of the recovery process. As a relevant difference
with respect to our case Deneijer and Flapper (2005) assume a network which is under
full control of the OEM whereas here independent actors are considered.
4. Assumptions and Notation
We develop a two-period model where the competition on spare parts demand
comes into effect in the second period only, since broken parts returning in the first
period are supposed to be recovered by repair shops or the OEM for use in the second
period. Thus, a two period model (with period index t = 1, 2) captures all relevant
relationships and effects, still guaranteeing a sufficient analytical tractability of the
model itself.
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There are n repair shops servicing customer demand in distinct areas. Each repair
shop i = 1, .., n faces a deterministic demand in period t = 1, 2, which is denoted by
di,t and known to all players. Customers are homogeneous regarding their willingness
to pay for repair service: they only accept a repaired spare part when a discount is
offered. Thus, the prices that customers pay for spare parts are set to the customers’
maximum willingness to pay for the respective service, and are given by px for new
(OEM) replacement and by pr for repaired parts (pr < px). We only consider the
non-warranty service, since warranty demand for spare parts must be satisfied using
new replacement parts.
The main source for spare parts is the OEM, which delivers new parts to repair
shops at a price ps. Another option consists of repairing broken parts. In our case,
broken parts are property of the customer, but for convenience reasons most customers
leave broken parts to the repair shop: therefore, we assume that all customers will
behave like this. Although being authorized by the OEM, repair shops can not be
forced to return broken parts to the OEM. Thus, they are completely free to repair
these parts for later service at cost crr. This parameter already includes cost of holding
the item until the next period. If the item is not needed it can be disposed of yielding
a non-negative salvage revenue s ≥ 0. Otherwise, repair shops would not take back
broken parts. We assume that the salvage revenue does not differ between broken and
repaired/remanufactured parts.
The OEM is assumed not to keep any inventory of new parts but to produce/procure
spare parts as needed at cost cop. So as to encourage an abundant repairable part flow
from repair shops to the OEM, a buyback price pb > 0 is considered. In contrast to
repair shops, the OEM is able to remanufacture broken parts such that they are as good
as a new part to be sold at the same price. Remanufacturing unit cost is given by cor.
Furthermore, the OEM is responsible for all transportation. Forward transportation
unit cost for spare parts is given by cst and transportation cost of parts returned from
repair shops is cbt . Transportation costs linearly depend on the number ordered because,
in practice, replacement parts are only ordered when needed for service. A similar
procedure is assumed to be applied for broken parts returned. In order to assure a
meaningful solution, providing spare parts should be profitable to the OEM, i.e. the
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price that repair shops pay for spare parts should exceed the cost of providing a new
spare part (including transportation cost, cop + c
s
t < ps).
We consider a simplified framework with complete information on costs and demand
at each repair shop. Further modeling assumptions, mainly related to the two-period
model considered, are:
• There is neither an initial stock of repaired components at repair shops or reman-
ufactured components at the OEM nor a stock of produced items. The buyback
price pb is set by the OEM.
• In the first period, repair shops face a demand and consequently, they order
a number of replacement parts xsi,1 at the OEM. A decision is to be made by
the repair shop on the number of broken parts that are kept and repaired yri ,
returned to the OEM xbi , or disposed of x
d
i . Then, the OEM will decide about
the remanufacturing quantity yo.
• In the second period, repair shops use their inventory to meet demand and, if
necessary, they order further xsi,2 units from the OEM. The OEM first fills demand
using remanufactured items and, as a second choice, it produces to satisfy the
remaining demand.
• At the end, all remaining items need to be disposed of.
• We restrict the analysis to the case of the same time dependent demand structure
faced by each repair shop, i.e. a commonly rising (di,1 ≤ di,2 ∀i) or falling demand
(di,1 ≥ di,2 ∀i). This assumption is justified when considering identical product
life cycle patterns at each repair shop.
The notation is summarized in Table 1.
5. The Model
In this section, a multistage decision process is modeled to determine whether the
OEM offers buyback, which buyback price pb the OEM pays for each returned core
and all subsequent operational decisions made by OEM and repair shops. Afterward,
the model is solved in reverse order of decisions made.
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Table 1: Notation used
Parameters and data
t period index with t = 1, .., 2
n number of repair shops
i repair shops index with i = 1, .., n
di,t deterministic demand in period t at repair shop i
px price paid by customer for installation of replacement parts
ps price paid by repair shops for buying replacement parts from the OEM
cst forward transportation cost for spare parts (paid by the OEM)
cop cost of producing replacement parts by the OEM
pr price paid by customer for installation of repaired parts
crr cost of repairing a part at the repair shop
s salvage revenue for unused items
cbt buyback transportation cost for broken parts (paid by the OEM)
cor remanufacturing cost at the OEM
Decisions and states
yri parts repaired to stock at a repair shop i in the first period
xbi parts sent back by repair shop i to the OEM in the first period
xdi parts disposed of by repair shop i in the first period
xsi,t parts procured by repair shop i from the OEM in period t
yo parts remanufactured to stock by the OEM in the first period
pb buyback price the OEM pays for broken parts sent back from repair shops
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5.1. Decisions and period specific cash flows
Initially, the OEM decides whether buyback is offered and, if it is, upon the buyback
price pb at which broken parts are bought back in the first period.
Period 1. During the first period, the final customer demand for spare parts is di,1 at
each repair shop i. Since there is no initial stock of repaired items on hand, all demand
is satisfied by buying new spare parts from the OEM yielding a net cash inflow of
(px − ps) · di,1. At the end of the period, repair shops decide upon further use of the
returned cores according to three available options:
• repair and stock-keeping of a number of cores yri ≤ di,1 at cost c
r
r · y
r
i ,
• dispose of the remaining cores xbi
• return the remaining cores to the OEM
The salvage revenue allows the determination of which one of the last two options
should be chosen, i.e.
(xbi , x
d
i ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(di,1 − y
r
i , 0) if pb > s
(0, di,1 − y
r
i ) if pb ≤ s
. (1)
This choice yields a revenue of max{pb, s} · (di,1 − y
r
i ). Cash flows of repair shops in
the first period CFri,1 depend on repair, disposal and return decisions, i.e.
CFri,1
(
yri , x
d
i , x
b
i ; pb
)
= (px − ps)·di,1 +max{pb, s}·(di,1 − y
r
i )− c
r
r ·y
r
i (2)
where yri ≤ di,1
The OEM faces a total demand for spare parts D1 =
∑n
i=1 di,1, which are supplied
by procuring/producing new items at unit costs cop and sending them to the respective
repair shops at cost cst , thus yielding a net cash inflow of (ps − c
o
p − c
s
t ) · D1. A total
number of returned cores Xb =
∑n
i=1 x
b
i causes a cash outflow of (pb + c
b
t) · X
b which
takes into account both transfer price and transportation cost. Now, the OEM decides
upon remanufacturing and stock-keeping cores yo ≤ Xb, leading to a cash outflow
cor · y
o for the remanufactured ones and an inflow s · (Xb − yo) for those items which
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are disposed of. Once total return quantities are given, the cash flow of the OEM only
depends on his remanufacturing decision yo, i.e.
CFo1(y
o;Xb, pb) = (ps−c
o
p−c
s
t)·D1−(pb+c
b
t)·X
b−cor ·y
o+s·(Xb−yo)
where yo ≤ Xb. (3)
Period 2. During the second period, the final customer demand for spare parts is di,2
at each repair shop i. Let D2 be the total demand, i.e. D2 =
∑n
i=1 di,2. At the end of
the second period all obligations for supplying spare parts end, therefore no decisions
are to be taken on repair/remanufacturing. Repair shops use their stock of repaired
parts yri to fill demand for spare parts di,2 as far as possible. This fact leads to a cash
inflow pr ·min{y
r
i , di,2}. Excess demand is filled by procuring new parts from the OEM.
Both the remaining stock (if any) and the returned cores are disposed of. Therefore
repair shop i orders a quantity xsi,2 = (di,2 − y
r
i )
+ from the OEM (where (x)+ denotes
max{x, 0}). The net cash flow of repair shop i in the second period CFri,2 is given by
CFri,2(y
r
i ) = pr ·min {y
r
i , di,2}+ (px−ps) · (di,2−y
r
i )
+ + s · (yri − di,2)
+. (4)
Given the OEM’s initial stock of remanufactured spare parts yo and the total de-
mand of all repair shops in the second period Xs2 =
∑n
i=1 x
s
i,2, the net cash flow of the
OEM in this period CFo2 becomes:
CFo2 (y
o, Xs2) = (ps − c
s
t) ·X
s
2 − c
o
p · (X
s
2 − y
o)+ + s · (yo −Xs2)
+. (5)
Our aim is to find the buyback price that maximizes the total profit of the OEM. As
the repair shop strategies, with the exception of the buyback price, are not influenced
by the OEM and the OEM’s decisions depend on the repair shop choices, we further
proceed as follows. First, optimal strategies of the repair shops are derived for a given
buyback price and the results are used to find optimal responses of the OEM and
finally, a buyback price is selected.
5.2. Optimal strategies for repair shops
The objective of a repair shop is to select a repair quantity yri given a buyback
price pb in order to maximize the total profit consisting of both periods’ cash flows.
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Subsuming (2) and (4) and rearranging the expression obtained yields the following
optimization problem
maxΠri (y
r
i ; pb) = (px−ps)
(
di,1+(di,2−y
r
i )
+
)
+max{pb, s} (di,1−y
r
i )
−crry
r
i +pr min {di,2, y
r
i }+s(y
r
i −di,2)
+ (6)
s.t. 0 ≤ yri ≤ di,1.
It is easy to see that, in the case of deterministic demand, the repair quantity should
not exceed the second period’s demand, i.e. di,2 ≥ y
r
i . Thus, objective (6) reduces to
Πri (y
r
i ; pb) = (px−ps) (di,1+di,2−y
r
i ) + max {pb, s} (di,1−y
r
i )− c
r
ry
r
i + pry
r
i .
Resorting terms and introducing the additional unit profit earned by the repair shops
through repairing of used parts πr = (pr − c
r
r)− (px − ps) leads to the following formu-
lation:
Πri (y
r
i ; pb) = [πr −max {pb, s}] y
r
i + (px−ps) (di,1+di,2) + max{pb, s}di,1 (7)
s.t. 0 ≤ yri ≤ min{di,1, di,2}.
Total profit linearly depends on the repair decision yri . If the square brackets term in
(7) is positive, repair takes place at the highest possible level, otherwise it does not
take place at all, i.e.
yri =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
min{di,1, di,2} if πr > max {pb, s}
0 otherwise
. (8)
In conclusion, all decisions on returning cores to the OEM xbi , disposal of cores x
d
i ,
repairing cores yri , together with the consequential demand for new spare parts in the
second period xsi,2 depend on the relationship between salvage revenue, buyback price,
and additional profit for repair shops through repair, as provided by (1) and (8). In
other terms, four cases with a different policy structure are obtained, as stated in Table
2.
In Case 1 (disposal only) salvage revenue s exceeds both buyback price pb as well
as additional unit repair profit πr. All returned cores are disposed of and demand of
the second period is completely filled by using new spare parts. Case 2 (repair and
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Table 2: Optimal repair shop strategies.
Cases and Policy structure
conditions xb
i
xd
i
yr
i
xs
i,2
Case 1
max{πr, pb} ≤ s 0 di,1 0 di,2
Case 2
pb ≤ s < πr 0 (di,1 − di,2)
+ min{di,2, di,1} (di,2 − di,1)
+
Case 3
s < pb < πr (di,1 − di,2)
+ 0 min{di,2, di,1} (di,2 − di,1)
+
Case 4
pb > max{s, πr} di,1 0 0 di,2
where πr=(pr−c
r
r)−(px−ps) is the additional profit for repair shops through repair
disposal) is characterized by a buyback price lower than the salvage revenue which,
in turn, is exceeded by the additional unit repair profit. Repairing takes place at its
highest possible level. In the second period, excess demand is filled by new spare parts.
If the number of used cores available in the first period is larger than actually needed,
exceeding cores are disposed of. Case 3 (repair and take back) differs from the
previous case because buyback price is higher than salvage revenue. Therefore, those
cores which would have been disposed of in Case 2 are now returned to the OEM.
In Case 4 (full take back), returning used cores to the OEM shows the highest
profitability. Thus all cores are returned and second period’s demand is filled by new
parts.
5.3. Optimal OEM responses
Two decisions made at the repair shops particularly affect the OEM. Second period’s
demands xsi,2 influence the quantity of new spare parts sold and return quantities
xbi determine transfer payments and remanufacturing opportunities. Of course, both
decisions depend on the relationship between salvage revenue at repair shops and the
additional unit repair profit. However, they also depend on the buyback price. We
first examine these decisions from the OEM point of view and subsequently elaborate
their impact on his profit Πo for a given buyback price. Later, findings will be used to
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determine the buyback decision that maximizes the profit.
Second period’s orders for new spare parts xsi,2 equal customer demand in two cases,
either if the repair option is dominated by disposal of cores or by the buyback option.
If the additional unit repair profit encompasses the benefits of all other options, the
OEM faces a demand only when the second period’s demand is larger than the number
of cores becoming available in the first period, i.e. first periods demand. Thus,
xsi,2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
di,2 if πr ≤ max{pb, s}
(di,2 − di,1)
+ otherwise
. (9)
If the buyback price is sufficiently high and it further exceeds the salvage revenue,
all returns are sent back to the OEM. Otherwise, the OEM will not receive anything
when the buyback price is smaller than salvage revenue and demand is expected to fall,
or when repair shops do not return needed items which can only be disposed of, i.e.
xbi =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
di,1 if pb > πr and pb > s
(di,1 − di,2)
+ if pb ≤ πr and pb > s
0 otherwise
. (10)
Given an identical cost structure for all repair shops, also the cumulative return
quantities as well as second period’s orders the OEM faces show the just derived struc-
ture and we could proceed with aggregate numbers Xb =
∑n
i=1 x
b
i , and X
s
2 =
∑n
i=1 x
s
i,2.
Once a buyback price is set, the objective of the OEM is to select a remanufacturing
quantity yo that maximizes total profit:
maxΠo
(
yo;Xb, Xs2 , pb
)
= (ps−c
o
p−c
s
t)D1−(pb+c
b
t−s)X
b−(cor+s)y
o
+(ps−c
s
t)X
s
2 − c
o
p(X
s
2−y
o)++s(yo−Xs2)
+
s.t. 0 ≤ yo ≤ Xb (11)
From (9) it can be observed that xsi,2 ≤ di,2 and therefore X
s
2 ≤ D2. Since demand is
known to him, the OEM never would remanufacture more than needed, i.e. yo ≤ Xs2 ,
thus yo ≤ D2. After some resorting of terms, the following optimization problem results
maxΠo
(
yo;Xb, Xs2 , pb
)
= (ps−c
o
p−c
s
t)(D1+X
s
2)− (pb+c
b
t−s)X
b +
+[cop−c
o
r−s]y
o
s.t. 0 ≤ yo ≤ min{Xb, Xs2} (12)
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An optimal solution to optimization problem (12) is easily obtained by evaluating
the term in square brackets which we further define as the direct remanufacturing
cost advantage (DRCA). In case of a positive DRCA (cop − c
o
r − s > 0), returns are
remanufactured at the highest possible level. Otherwise, remanufacturing does not
take place, i.e.
yo =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
min{Xb, Xs2} if c
o
p − c
o
r − s > 0
0 otherwise
. (13)
As observed before, return and order quantities (and thus profit, too) depend on
repair shop decisions as given in (9) and (10). In order to be able to subsequently
select a buyback price by comparing the corresponding profit functions, four different
cases are identified.
Case 1 (max{πr, pb} ≤ s). In this case the most profitable option for repair shops is
to dispose of all used parts, thus Xb = 0 and the second period’s orders equal total
demand Xs2 = D2. Due to the lack of returns, the remanufacturing quantity at the
OEM is zero (yo = 0), and total profit (12) simplifies to
Πo1 = (ps − c
o
p − c
s
t)(D1 +D2) (14)
Case 2 (pb ≤ s < πr). In this case no used products are returned to the OEM (X
b = 0),
thus remanufacturing is not possible at all (yo = 0). Second period’s demand is positive
only, if it is larger than the number of repaired items which is limited by first period’s
demand for spare parts, i.e. Xs2 = max{D2 −D1, 0}. Total profit is given by
Πo2 =
(
ps − c
o
p − c
s
t
)
max {D1, D2} (15)
Case 3 (s < pb < πr). In Case 3, for each repair shop a positive send back quantity
xbi = (di,1 − di,2)
+ and positive order quantity in the second period xsi,2 = (di,2 − di,1)
+
exclude each other option. Therefore, if a simultaneously falling (i.e. di,1 ≥ di,2) or
rising (i.e. di,1 ≤ di,2) demand occurs at each of the repair shops, remanufacturing
would not make sense for the OEM. Therefore, yo = 0 and the total profit is
maxΠo3 = (ps − c
o
p − c
s
t )max{D1, D2} − (pb + c
b
t − s)(D1 −D2)
+. (16)
However, if demand expectations would differ among repair shops, i.e. for some
demand decreases from period to period and it increases for others, both in Case 2 and
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3 pooling effects emerge, since e.g. in the latter case there might be both returns of
broken parts from repair shops for which demand decreases as well as second period’s
orders from those facing an increase in demand.
Case 4 (pb > max{s, πr}). In this case, the buyback price is such high that repairing
is no longer a profitable alternative for the repair shops. Thus, all broken parts are
returned to the OEM Xb = D1 and second period’s orders equal full demand X
s
2 =
D2. Now the OEM’s problem becomes to select a remanufacturing quantity y
o ≤
min{D1, D2} that maximizes total profit Π
o
4
Πo4(y
o) = (ps − c
o
p − c
s
t)(D1 +D2)− (pb + c
b
t − s)D1 + [c
o
p − c
o
r − s]y
o
s.t. 0 ≤ yo ≤ min{D1, D2} (17)
In case of a negative DRCA, remanufacturing does not take place and profit is:
Πo4a = (ps − c
o
p − c
s
t)(D1 +D2)− (pb + c
b
t − s)D1 (18)
Total profit consists of net profit due to spare parts sold (revenue decreased by trans-
portation and production costs), reduced by the cost of getting back broken parts and
their disposal.
Given a positive DRCA, two cases are to be distinguished. If the OEM faces a
constant or rising total demand, all returns are remanufactured and sold in the second
period (yo = D1), as spare parts must be produced to meet the second period’s demand.
Thus,
Πo4b =
(
ps − c
s
t − pb − c
b
t − c
o
r
)
D1 +
(
ps − c
o
p − c
s
t
)
D2 (19)
In the case of a falling demand, not all returned parts are remanufactured but some
are disposed of (yo = D2). No production will occur in the second period, i.e.
Πo4b =
(
ps − c
o
p − c
s
t − pb − c
b
t + s
)
D1 + (ps − c
s
t − c
o
r − s)D2 (20)
Table 3 summarizes the main findings of all four cases.
5.4. Total profit comparison to find conditions for setting price pb
In order to set the optimal buyback price pb, it is necessary to identify conditions
which make it reasonable to enter in one of the above determined Cases 1 to 4. This ob-
jective is accomplished by comparing OEM profits in the respective cases. We identify
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Table 3: Optimal OEM strategies.
Cases and conditions yo Πo
Case 1:
max{πr, pb} ≤ s 0 (ps−c
o
p−c
s
t )(D1+D2)
Case 2:
pb ≤ s < πr 0 (ps−c
o
p−c
s
t )max{D1, D2}
Case 3:
s < pb < πr 0 (ps−c
o
p−c
s
t )max{D1, D2} − (pb+c
b
t−s)(D1−D2)
+
Case 4a:(no reman.)
pb > max{πr, s}
and cop−c
o
r−s ≤ 0 0 (ps−c
o
p−c
s
t )(D1+D2)− (pb+c
b
t−s)D1
Case 4b:(reman.)
pb > max{πr, s} D1(≤D2) (ps−c
s
t−pb−c
b
t−c
o
r)D1 + (ps−c
o
p−c
s
t )D2
and cop−c
o
r−s > 0 D2(<D1) (ps−c
o
p−c
s
t−pb−c
b
t+s)D1 + (ps−c
s
t−c
o
r−s)D2
two drivers which influence product recovery at the repair shop level, i.e. the relation-
ship between additional profit earned by repair shops when repairing broken parts πr
and the salvage revenue they obtain when disposing of broken parts s.
Setting A: πr ≤ s. In Setting A, repair shops would not repair and thus, independently
of his buyback price decision the OEM would face full demand in both of the periods.
Under this setting Cases 2 and 3 by definition cannot occur, and therefore (depend-
ing on the buyback price) either Case 1 or 4 is present. If there is no DRCA, and
remanufacturing is therefore not profitable for the OEM, Table 3 shows that Case 1
always dominates Case 4a. This means that from a strategic point of view there is no
motivation to buy back broken parts if these neither can be used for remanufacturing
nor influence spare parts demand faced by the OEM.
In case of a positive DRCA, i.e. cop − c
o
r − s > 0, Case 4b is preferable to Case 1 if
there is a price pb for which the difference
Πo4b−Π
o
1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(cop−c
o
r−pb−c
b
t)D1 for D1 ≤ D2
(cop−c
o
r−pb−c
b
t)D2 + (s−pb−c
b
t)(D1−D2) for D1 > D2
(21)
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is positive. In order to favor Case 4b, this comparison requires at least
s < pb < c
o
p − c
o
r − c
b
t , (22)
i.e. the price pb must be large enough to encourage repair shops to return broken parts
and, at the same time, it must be such small that remanufacturing can compensate
cost of buyback as well as transportation. Consequently, the DRCA should be larger
than transportation cost cbt . This necessary condition is also sufficient in the case of
increasing demand. However, since in the case of falling demand some of the returned
parts must be disposed of, the actual profit difference must be evaluated in order to
decide. In Case 4b the optimal buyback price would be slightly larger than disposal
revenue, i.e. pb = s+ , and in Case 1 buyback would not take place.
Setting B: πr > s. Under this setting, no buying back of broken parts would mean
a loss in demand faced by the OEM in the second period. For this setting, all cases
apply, exception given for Case 1. Case 2 applies for pb values with pb < s, Case 3 is
present if s ≤ pb < πr, and Case 4 requires pb ≥ πr. When comparing Cases 3 and
Case 2 the profit difference becomes:
Πo3 − Π
o
2 = −(pb + c
b
t − s)(D1 −D2)
+. (23)
Case 3 would be preferable to Case 2 when s < pb < πr for which pb < s − c
b
t and
D1 > D2 hold. By definition of Case 3 (pb > s), no such price can exist. Thus, Case 3
always is dominated by Case 2. It is not reasonable for the OEM to select a buyback
price pb out of the interval (s, πr), otherwise repair shops would return only parts which
can not further be used. This fact requires to identify circumstances under which it
makes sense to have a buyback price smaller than salvage revenue s or larger than the
additional repair profit πr. This is accomplished by comparing Cases 2 and 4.
If the DRCA is negative (cop − c
o
r − s ≤ 0), Case 4a is preferable to Case 2 if there
is price pb > πr, for which
Πo4a − Π
o
2 = (ps − c
o
p − c
s
t)min{D1, D2}+ (s− pb − c
b
t)D1 (24)
is larger than zero. The first term in (24) denotes the additional profit from selling
more spare parts to repair shops and it is always positive. The second term gives the
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cost of taking back broken parts and disposing of them and it is negative by definition
of Setting B. Thus, Case 4a is preferable to Case 2 if the additional profit more than
compensates additional cost.
In case of a positive DRCA (cop − c
o
r − s > 0), Case 4b is chosen if the difference
Πo4b−Π
o
2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(ps−c
s
t−pb−c
b
t−c
o
r)D1 for D1 ≤ D2
(ps−c
s
t−pb−c
b
t−c
o
r)D2+(s−pb−c
b
t)(D1−D2) for D1 > D2
(25)
is positive. In order to receive broken parts from repair shops, the buyback price must
at least surmount salvage revenue (pb > s), thus requiring a price pb for which it holds
πr < pb < ps − c
s
t − c
b
t − c
o
r, (26)
which in turn requires that the price of a spare parts should be less than the trans-
portation cost and the remanufacturing cost should exceed the additional repair shop
profit. Thus, Case 4b is preferable to Case 2 if equation (25) is positive. In Case 4b,
the buyback price would be set at a level enabling it to exceed additional repair profit,
i.e. pb = πr + , and in Case 2 buyback would not take place.
Main insights. Table 4 provides a complete guideline on how to decide whether to
perform buyback at all and which buyback price pb to choose. The additional profit
generated through buyback (given it takes place) can be determined from equation
(21) in Situations where πr ≤ s and otherwise from equations (24) or (25), depending
on whether the direct recovery advantage (DRCA) is positive or not. With respect to
the buyback price it can be stated that it should be set to max{s, πr}+ . Generalizing
the results it can be stated that buyback is more likely to be profitable if the demand
for spare parts increases, and therefore it should be implemented early in the service
life cycle of a product.
6. Numerical Example
In this section we show the applicability of the results found in the previous section.
We will use as reference two different boilers produced by the case company. All
prices and cost data given in Table 5 originate from that company but they have
been disguised in order to protect confidentiality. Customer demands for spare parts
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Table 4: Guideline on decision about performing buyback at all and which buyback price pb to choose.
Setting A: πr ≤ s Setting B: πr > s
DRCA≤0 no buyback
compare profit:
Πo4a−Π
o
2 ≤ 0 ⇒ no buyback
Πo4a−Π
o
2 > 0 ⇒ pb = πr+
DRCA>0
if DRCA≤cbt ⇒ no buyback
if DRCA>cbt and demand is
− rising ⇒ pb = s+
− falling ⇒ compare profit:
Πo4b−Π
o
1 ≤ 0 ⇒ no buyback
Πo4b−Π
o
1 > 0 ⇒ pb = s+
if πr≥ps−c
s
t−c
b
t−c
o
r ⇒ no buyback
if πr<ps−c
s
t−c
b
t−c
o
r and demand is
− rising ⇒ pb = πr+
− falling ⇒ compare profit:
Πo4b−Π
o
2 ≤ 0 ⇒ no buyback
Πo4b−Π
o
2 > 0 ⇒ pb = πr+
are estimated. There are about 500 repair shops the company must deal with. The
two considered products are characterized by different settings: one product has been
recently introduced into the market (therefore its spare parts demand is increasing)
while the second product is going to be eliminated from the product range and demand
for spare parts will be decreasing in the next years. All parameter values are reported
in Table 5 where cost are in e. Since remanufacturing is not performed at the moment,
there are no cost data available. We will therefore use our approach to select a buyback
price for each of the two products (1) for the case where remanufacturing cost are very
high and (2) we will determine maximum unit cost for which remanufacturing will be
applied by the OEM.
In the case of high remanufacturing cost, the direct recovery cost advantage (DRCA)
is negative. Since for both of the products the additional profit when repairing πr
exceeds disposal cost s (see Table 5) we have to deal with the top right box of Table
4. Evaluating the additional profit when performing buyback (i.e. the profit difference
Table 5: Data in illustrating examples.
Data di,1 di,2 px ps pr c
r
r πr s c
o
p c
s
t c
b
t
Model 1 5 10 80 65 40 15 10 2 36 15 3
Model 2 45 30 90 75 50 15 20 3 39 15 3
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between Cases 4a and 2) yields for Model 1: Πo4a − Π
o
2 = 77 500e−70 000e= 7500e
and for Model 2: -135 000e. Thus, for the first model the buyback would pay off
(pModel 1b = 10 + ), because of the additional units sold by the OEM. For Model 2
buyback does not take place.
When introducing remanufacturing, it emerges that remanufacturing cost should be
small enough to have a positive direct remanufacturing cost advantage, i.e. cop−c
o
r−s >
0. Thus, remanufacturing cost for Model 1 must not exceed 34 e and for the second
36 e. Next we must assure that remanufacturing costs are small enough that the
inequality in the bottom right box of Table 4 is satisfied, i.e. cor < ps− c
s
t − c
b
t −πr. For
both of the models this yields 37 e which is larger than the upper bounds. Since for
Model 1 demand is rising, remanufacturing is profitable for any unit cost lower than
34 e and the buyback price is pModel 1b = 10 + . Since demand for Model 2 is falling,
we have to find a remanufacturing unit cost rate at which the profit difference (i.e.
Πo4b − Π
o
2) is zero. This happens at c
o
r = 27e. Therefore, for Model 2 remanufacturing
would take place at unit cost below 27e with a buyback price equal to pModel 2b = 20+.
7. Conclusions
In this work an analytical model was presented, which aims at capturing the eco-
nomic trade-offs in service supply chains where two main actors are considered: an
OEM and a network of independent repair shops. The industrial case that inspired
this work mainly concerns the investigation of the opportunity for an OEM to take
back damaged, though recoverable, components and sub-assemblies to start itself a
remanufacturing activity. This opportunity may lead to a threefold objective: the first
one is to prevent uncontrolled part recovery activities (being already performed by
some repair shops) from third parties. The second objective is represented by the op-
portunity to collect more information and data about the on-field performance of the
components installed (e.g., failure behavior and frequency), thus offering the oppor-
tunity for design improvement and preventive maintenance adoption. Of course, the
last but not least objective is the opportunity to increase profit because of the higher
demand and the remanufacturing activity.
The adopted optimization approach is directly related to the industrial case: op-
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timal strategies for repair shops are derived for a given buyback price, and these are
further used to find optimal responses of the OEM. By comparing total profit of the
OEM, a buyback price is selected and consequently the remanufacturing cost capable
of guaranteeing a profit to the OEM is calculated. Results have been applied to the
real case settings considering two different products. A numerical example shows that
each product requires a different buyback strategy and it reveals upper bounds for the
OEM’s remanufacturing costs so as to optimize the service chain.
There are certainly some limitations to this study which can be overcome by fur-
ther research and model refinements. In order to keep the analysis simple we assumed
identical costs for all repair shops and known to the OEM. Demand has been consid-
ered to be deterministic, although in reality the demand for spare parts is uncertain.
When operating within a stochastic environment, varying demand situations at differ-
ent repair shops might yield an opportunity for the OEM to exploit risk pooling effects
from centralized product recovery. The length of the planning horizon is limited to two
periods after which the remaining inventory becomes obsolete. A longer horizon would
make it possible to collect broken parts for later use. Another interesting question that
we would like to address in future consists of a simultaneous setting of the buyback
price and the price repair shops pay for new parts.
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